Pearson v. Board of Health of Chicopee was a case before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1988 concerning open meetings law.
[edit] Important precedents
This case established that attorney fees could not be awarded in open meetings law cases.
[edit] Background
- On July 2, 1986, Meredith Carlson of the Holyoke Transcript observed the members of the city council meeting in an unscheduled closed session to discuss the reopening of a local restaurant which had had problems with salmonella poisoning. During the closed meeting, the board decided to allow the restaurant to reopen. The board, however, took no minutes of the meeting.
- On July 30, 1986, the board scheduled a separate meeting for 7pm. The board actually began their meeting at 6:15pm, convening in a closed room. The board then merely announced the determinations of their closed session at the open meeting, with no discussion.
- The newspaper filed suit and the trial court ruled in favor of the newspaper.
- The trial court granted the newspaper attorney's fees.
- The city appealed the decision to grant attorney fees. [1]
[edit] Ruling of the court
The trial court ruled in favor of the newspapers, claiming that the behavior of the city represented a "flagrant" disregard for the Massachusetts Open Meetings Act. As a result, it compelled the city to create minutes for all passed closed meetings, negated the decisions made in closed meetings, and most importantly for the appeal, ordered the city to pay attorneys fees of $3,050.18. The attorney fees were awarded under the argument that the newspaper had acted in the public interest as a brand of private attorney general[1]
The Supreme Court overturned the award of attorney fees and ruled in favor of the cities appeal.
The Supreme Court held that most states refuse to award attorney fees based on a "private attorney general theory", and that Massachusetts would be no exception. The court declared that, absent a change in statute, the court saw no reason to award attorney fees in open meetings cases, as it was not justified by statute and that common practice was to award attorney fees only in certain situations, namely, "(1) as costs, in accordance with specific statutory provisions or court rules . . . ; (2) as damages, in certain circumstances . . . ; (3) in accordance with statutory provisions under some of which the allowance may not be clearly categorized or may not be categorized at all . . . ; or (4) pursuant to a valid contractual provision or stipulation"[1].
[edit] Associated cases
[edit] See Also
[edit] External links
[edit] References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Ruling of the Court
